What outcomes can be supported as pure-strategy Nash equilibria?

to understand how fightin Show more Hawk-Dove: The following game has been widely used in evolutionary biology to understand how fighting and display strategies by animals could coexist in a population. For a typical Hawk-Dove game there are resources to be gained (e.g. food mates territories) denoted as v. Each of two players can choose to be aggressive as Hawk (H) or compromising as Dove (D). If both players choose H then they split the resources but lose some payoff from injuries denoted as k. Assume that k > v/2 2 . If both choose D then they split the resources but engage in some display of power that carries a display cost d with d < v/2 2 . Finally if player i chooses H while j chooses D then i gets all the resources while j leaves with no benefits and no costs. a. Describe this game in a matrix. b. Assume that v = 10 k = 6 and d = 4. What outcomes can be supported as pure-strategy Nash equilibria? please explain each step Show less

QUICK QUOTE

Approximately 250 words